Re: The Problem of Social Cost, Part 1
On whose morals should we rely when making the decisions consequences of which span across the social milieu upon which the initiation was predicated?
Summary of the Article: THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST
The article commences with questions that would undoubtedly raise an ample amount of concerns from moral critics; it borders on the notions of utilitarianism; however, it is hard to state that it is the concept that is being expounded upon here. Moreover, one such question is the allowance to harm because the restraint to harm would lead to harm to the one being restrained. As obvious –yet partial– solutions to the dilemma we are discussing, they remind us that the only thing that we can do to solve (or, in my view, absolve ourselves from the responsibility of trying to evaluate the moral implications of the activities and actors to whom harm would bring marginal benefits for the society as a whole) it is to estimate the activities and the totality of the outcomes.
I am afraid I have to disagree with the contention that the classical assessment of the activity's value would result in the meaningful resolution of our perennial problem – whether we should harm someone in the first place, even if it produces a marginal benefit in terms of the economic output. Nonetheless, the article provides a clear example of the cattle raiser and the farmer, and chapter 3 merely regurgitates the related ideas (with vivid and compelling arguments, yet no unique and outstanding conclusion has been reached). Chapter 4 starts from the assumption that the pricing system works smoothly, which is by and large not settled. Moreover, I want to stop here and explore whether it is even possible in real life, at least to some extent. The article gave me a reference to the Theory of Price by Prof. Stigler. Moreover, while it does not provide an ultimate answer–as always, I am sure there is no answer, only debatable conclusions that are grounded on one individual's presumption and ideologies– and in addition to expressly detaching themselves from the responsibility behind the ideas presented by asserting that the economics is less exact science that it is generally portrayed, it does provide some perspective on how to handle the market demand and the utility at large.
Chapter 5 starts with a straightforward case of the confectioner and the doctor, which results in a proposition that should be generally considered common sense – the bargain between parties should prevail over bringing the legal charges, making it the last resort for the parties at dispute. The means of monetary redress is the most viable solution that one can proffer; however, for me, it does not recompense for all of the obscure harms that are inherently caused due to the continuation of the activity via the absence of injunction (in this case, use of the machinery that produces intolerable for the doctor's consulting activities noise) such as moral anguish that is always present when you leave the place of your continued residence, such as all of the necessary legal procedure about your paperwork and the client's arrangements, let alone the inconvenience it causes for the suppliers and the clients who had relied on the premise of the availability of your place of residence for business cooperation. Considering all that, deciding who is less or more harmed is nearly impossible to calculate as the prices on your mental state and the indirect concept of inconveniences are not settled and vary if they can be assessed. Consequently, I can conclude that the article does not account for all of the aspects of the value that the continuation of the revenue-generating (and sometimes, even that is less relevant for calculating the harm incurred) exerts over human society. Omitting those through deliberations is to neglect the broad aspect of the human condition that economics, as one of the social sciences, is expected to govern. I am glad that Judge Cotton raised this point, or at least what commensurates the one I have pointed out, that the comfort of human existence was violated. The comfort one has in their premises is that they expect a reasonable degree of privacy and all of the environs to produce comfort, including the absence of nuisances or unwanted guests unless the guests are the co-occupiers of the area. In his opinion, I removed the word egress for my future references, which seems to represent a slightly archaic or overly formal way of saying someone leaves the premises. When discussing the idea of shared liability in the case of the wall, they came up with the conclusion that The government is firm; in some sense, here, Coase draws on the example that it can use administrative regulations for the sole sake of influencing the production outcomes, which are the traits of the firm. However, this parallel goes beyond only one example of the matching peculiarities of the government and the firm. As corporations and firms are constituted with their artificial charters, which are called constitutions, corporations have their charters that define the nature and the type of their daily operations.
The cost of the market transactions is not usually considered when the question of legal rights arises, which is the approach that veers from the path of ultimate justice. Moreover, the article shows that they should be considered when calculating the righteousness of one or another solution. Prosser on Torts stated that he conducts his affairs at the expense of some harm to his neighbor. It will be the central revelation that I will carry in my life with the understanding that it is the right thing to do to disturb your neighbors when the utility of your disturbance and the degree of disturbance is within reasonable bounds.
What is reasonable? And if there is some normative foundation that defines the issue, then whether or not neighbor’s personal wishes affect in any way or manner perceptual conception of the harm itself often amplifying and on occasions abating with his circumstantial absence of the anger.
It is subject to future interpretation and contextual adjustments of what is "within reasonable bounds." However, we are free to assume that minimal annoyance is undoubtedly acceptable as the norm of human existence. Moreover, in furtherance of the importance of the circumstances, the judges further elaborate: "What would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in Bermondsey; and where a locality is devoted to a particular trade or manufacture carried on by the traders or manufacturers in a particular and established manner not constituting a public nuisance, Judges and juries would be justified in finding, and may be trusted to find, that the trade or manufacture so carried on in that locality is not a private or actionable wrong." Moreover, as Salmond described, that is the fault of the person who has set up his abode in the middle of the noisy downtown, and the location diminishes his enjoyment of the quietude and those from whom the sounds arise.